Adversarial Perturbations Against Real-Time Video Classification Systems by Li, Shasha et al.
Adversarial Perturbations Against Real-Time Video
Classification Systems
Shasha Li
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California
sli057@ucr.edu
Ajaya Neupane
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California
ajaya@ucr.edu
Sujoy Paul
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California
spaul003@ucr.edu
Chengyu Song
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California
csong@cs.ucr.edu
Srikanth V. Krishnamurthy
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California
krish@cs.ucr.edu
Amit K. Roy Chowdhury
University of California, Riverside
Riverside, California
amitrc@ece.ucr.edu
Ananthram Swami
United States Army Research
Laboratory
ananthram.swami.civ@mail.mil
ABSTRACT
Recent research has demonstrated the brittleness of machine learn-
ing systems to adversarial perturbations. However, the studies have
been mostly limited to perturbations on images and more generally,
classification that does not deal with temporally varying inputs.
In this paper we ask "Are adversarial perturbations possible in
real-time video classification systems and if so, what properties
must they satisfy?" Such systems find application in surveillance
applications, smart vehicles, and smart elderly care and thus, mis-
classification could be particularly harmful (e.g., a mishap at an
elderly care facility may be missed). We show that accounting for
temporal structure is key to generating adversarial examples in
such systems. We exploit recent advances in generative adversarial
network (GAN) architectures to account for temporal correlations
and generate adversarial samples that can cause misclassification
rates of over 80 % for targeted activities. More importantly, the
samples also leave other activities largely unaffected making them
extremely stealthy. Finally, we also surprisingly find that in many
scenarios, the same perturbation can be applied to every frame in a
video clip that makes the adversary’s ability to achieve misclassifi-
cation relatively easy.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have found an increasing role in real
world applications for the purposes of real-time video classification.
Examples of such applications include video surveillance [38], self
driving cars [20], health-care [48], etc. To elaborate, video surveil-
lance systems capable of automated detection of undesired human
behaviors (e.g., violence) can trigger alarms and drastically reduce
information workloads on human operators. Without the assistance
of DNN-based classifiers, human operators will need to simultane-
ously view and assess footage from a large number of video sensors.
This can be a difficult and exhausting task, and comes with the
risk of missing behaviors of interest and slowing down decision
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cycles. In self-driving cars, video classification has been used to
understand pedestrian actions and make navigation decisions [20].
Real-time video classification systems have also been deployed for
automatic “fall detection” in elderly care facilities [48], and abnor-
mal detection around automated teller machines [43]. All of these
applications directly relate to the physical security or safety of
people and property. Thus, stealthy attacks on such real-time video
classification systems are likely to cause unnoticed pecuniary loss
and compromise personal safety.
Recent studies have shown that virtually all DNN-based systems
are vulnerable to well-designed adversarial inputs [10, 26, 27, 35, 39],
which are also referred to as adversarial examples. Szegedy et al. [39]
showed that adversarial perturbations that are hardly perceptible to
humans can cause misclassification in DNN-based image classifiers.
Goodfellow et al. [11] analyzed the potency of realizing adversarial
samples in the physical world. Moosavi et al. [26] and Mopuri et al.
[29] introduced the concept of “image-agnostic” perturbations. As
such, the high level question that we try to answer in this paper is “Is
it possible to launch stealthy attacks against DNN-based real-time
video classification systems, and if so how?”
Attacking a video classifier is more complex than attacking an
image classifier, because of the presence of the temporal dimen-
sion in addition to the spatial dimensions present in 2D images.
Specifically, attacking a real-time video classifier poses additional
challenges. First, because the classification is performed in real-time,
the corresponding perturbations also need to be generated on-the-
fly with the same frame rate which is extremely computationally
intensive. Second, to make the attack stealthy, attackers would want
to add perturbations on the video in such a way that they will
only cause misclassification for the targeted (possibly malicious)
actions, while keep the classification of other actions unaffected. In
a real-time video stream, since the activities change across time, it
is hard to identify online and in one-shot [8], the target frames on
which to add perturbations. Third, video classifiers use video clips
(a set of frames) as inputs [8, 43]. As video is captured, it is broken
up into clips and each clip is fed to the classifier. As a result, even if
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attackers are aware of the length of each clip (a hyper-parameter of
the classifier), it is hard to predict when each clip begins and ends.
Therefore, if they generate perturbations for a clip using traditional
methods (e.g., gradient descent), the perturbations might not work
because they are not aligned with the real clip the classifier is using
(Please see Figure 4 and the associated discussion for more details).
In this paper, our first objective is to investigate how to gener-
ate adversarial perturbations against real-time video classification
systems by overcoming the above challenges. We resolve the first
(real-time) challenge by using universal perturbations [26]. Univer-
sal perturbations allow us to affect the classification results using a
(single) set of perturbations generated off-line. Because they work
on unseen inputs they preclude the need for intensive on-line com-
putations to generate perturbations for every incoming video clip.
To generate such universal perturbations, we leverage the genera-
tive adversarial network (GAN) [10] architecture.
However, adding universal perturbations on all the frames of
the video can cause the misclassification of all the actions in the
video stream. This may expose the attack as the results may not
make sense (e.g., many people performing rare actions). To make
the attack stealthy, we introduce the novel concept of dual purpose
universal perturbations, which we define as universal perturbations
which only cause the misclassification for inputs belonging to the
target class, while minimize, or ideally, have no effect on the classi-
fication results for inputs belonging to the other classes.
Dual purpose perturbations by themselves do not provide high
success rates in terms ofmisclassification because of challenge three,
which is that the mis-alignment of the boundaries of perturbations
with respect to the real clip boundaries (input to the classifier)
significantly affects the misclassification success rates. To solve this
problem, we introduce a new type of perturbation that we call the
Circular Universal Dual Purpose Perturbations (C-DUP). The C-DUP
is a 3D perturbation (i.e., a perturbation clip composed of a sequence
of frames), which is a valid perturbation on a video regardless of
the start and end of each clip. In other words, it works on all cyclic
permutations of frames in a clip. To generate the C-DUP, we make
significant changes to the baseline GAN architecture. In particular,
we add a new unit to generate circular perturbations, that is placed
between the generator and the discriminator (as discussed later).
We demonstrate that the C-DUP is very stable and effective in
achieving real-time stealthy attacks on video classification systems.
After demonstrating the feasibility of stealthy attacks against
real-time video classification systems, our second objective is to
investigate the effect of the temporal dimension. In particular, we
investigate the feasibility of attacking the classification systems
using a simple and light 2D perturbation which is applied across
all the frames of a video. By tweaking our generative model, we
are able to generate such perturbations which we name as 2D Dual
Purpose Universal Perturbations (2D-DUP). These perturbations work
well on a sub-set of videos, but not all. We will discuss the reasons
for these 2D attacks in § 6.3.
Our Contributions: In brief, our contributions in this paper are:
• We provide a comprehensive analysis on the challenges in craft-
ing adversarial perturbations for real-time video classifiers. We
empirically identify what we call the boundary effect phenome-
non in generating adversarial perturbations against video (see § 6).
• We design and develop a generative framework to craft two types
of stealthy adversarial perturbations against real-time video clas-
sifiers, viz., circular dual purpose universal perturbation (C-DUP)
and 2D dual purpose universal perturbation (2D-DUP). These
perturbations are agnostic to (a) the video captured (universal)
and (b) the temporal sequence of frames in the clips input to the
video classification system (resistance to cyclic permutations of
frames in a clip).
• We demonstrate the potency of our adversarial perturbations us-
ing two different video datasets. In particular, the UCF101 dataset
captures coarse-grained activities (human actions such as apply-
ing eye makeup, bowling, drumming) [37]. The Jester dataset
captures fine-grained activities (hand gestures such as sliding
hand left, sliding hand right, turning hand clockwise, turning
hand counterclockwise) [7]. We are able to launch stealthy at-
tacks on both datasets with over a 80 % misclassification rate,
while ensuring that the other classes are correctly classified with
relatively high accuracy.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide the background relevant to our work.
Specifically, we discuss how a real-time video classification system
works and what standard algorithms are currently employed for
action recognition. We also discuss generative adversarial networks
(GANs) in brief.
2.1 Real-time video-based classification
systems
DNN based video classification systems are being increasingly de-
ployed in real-world scenarios. Examples include fall detection in
elderly care [9], abnormal event detection on campuses [45, 46],
security surveillance for smart cities [47], and self-driving cars
[20, 21]. Given an input real-time video stream, which may con-
tain one or more known actions, the goal of a video classification
system is to correctly recognize the sequence of the performed
actions. Real-time video classification systems commonly use a
sliding window to analyze a video stream [8, 43]. The classifier com-
putes an output score for each class in each sliding window. The
sliding window moves with a stride. Moving in concert with the
sliding window, one can generate “score curves” for each action
class. Note that the scores for all the action classes evolve with time.
The score curves are then smoothed (to remove noise) as shown
in Figure 1. With the smoothed score curves, the on-going actions
are predicted online. From the figure one can see that, the real-time
video classification system is fooled if one can make the classifier
output a low score for the true class in each sliding window; with
this, the true actions will not be recognized.
2.2 The C3D classifier
Next, we describe what is called the C3D classifier [42], a state of
the art classifier that we target in our paper.
DNNs and in particular convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
are being increasingly applied in video classification. Among these,
spatio-temporal networks like C3D [42] and two-stream networks
like I3D [6] outperform other network structures[13, 14]. With-
out the requirement of non-trivial pre-processing on the video
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Figure 1: This figure [8] illustrates the score curves com-
puted by a video classifier with a sliding window for every
class. Real-time video classification systems use these score
curves to do online action recognition.
stream, spatio-temporal networks demonstrate high efficiency;
among these, C3D is the start-of-art model [13].
The C3D model is generic, which means that it can differentiate
across different types of videos (e.g., videos of actions in sports,
actions involving pets, actions relating to food etc.). It also provides
a compact representation that facilitates scalability in processing,
storage, and retrieval. It is also extremely efficient in classifying
video streams (needed in real-time systems).
Given its desirable attributes and popularity, without loss of
generality, we use the C3D model as our attack target in this paper.
The C3D model is based on 3D ConvNet (a 3D CNN) [19, 42, 44],
which is very effective in modeling temporal information (because
it employs 3D convolution and 3D pooling operations).
The architecture and hyperparamters of C3D are shown in Fig-
ure 2. The input to the C3D classifier is a clip consisting of 16
consecutive frames. This means that upon using C3D, the sliding
window size is 16. Both the height and the width of each frame
are 112 pixels and each frame has 3 (RGB) channels. The last layer
of C3D is a softmax layer that provides a classification score with
respect to each class.
2.3 Generative Adversarial Networks and their
relevance
Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) [10] were initially de-
veloped to generate synthetic content (and in particular, images)
that conformed with the space of natural content [16, 53]. Recently,
there has also been work on using GANs for generating synthetic
videos [49]. The GAN consists of two components viz., a generator
or generative model that tries to learn the training data distribution
and a discriminator or discriminative model that seeks to distin-
guish the generated distribution from the training data distribution.
To elaborate, consider the use of a GAN for video generation. An
archtecture for this purpose is shown in Figure 3a. The generator
G , learns a map from a random vector z in latent space, to a natural
video clip V ; in other words, G(z) = V , where z is usually sampled
from a simple distribution such as a Gaussian distribution (N (0, 1))
or a uniform distribution (U (−1, 1)). The discriminator D takes a
video clip as input (either generated or natural), and outputs the
probability that it is from the training data (i.e., the probability that
the video clip is natural). The interactions between G and D are
modeled as a game and in theory, at the end G must be able to
generate video clips from the true training set distribution.
Recently, a GAN-like architecture has been used to generate ad-
versarial perturbations on images [29] . The authors of [29] keep a
trained discriminator fixed; its goal is to classify the inputs affected
by the perturbations from the generator. The generator learns from
the discriminator classifications to modulate its perturbations. Sim-
ilarly, we apply the GAN-like architecture wherein the objective
is to allow the generator to learn a distribution for candidate per-
turbations that can fool our discriminator. Our model incorporates
significant extensions to the GAN structure used in [29] to account
for the unique properties of video classification that were discussed
earlier.
3 THREAT MODEL AND DATASETS
In this section, we describe our threat model. We also provide a
brief overview of the datasets we chose for validating our attack
models.
3.1 Threat model
We consider a white-box model for our attack, i.e., the adversary has
access to the training datasets used to train the video classification
system, and has knowledge of the deep neural network model
the real-time classification system uses. We also assume that the
adversary is capable of injecting perturbations in the real-time
video stream. In particular, we assume the adversary to be a man-
in-the-middle that can intercept and add perturbations to streaming
video [23], or that it could have previously installed a malware that
is able to add perturbation prior to classification [31].
We assume that the goal of the adversaries is to launch stealthily
attacks, i.e., they want the system to only misclassify the malicious
actions without affecting the recognition of the other actions. So,
we consider two attack goals. First, given a target class, we want all
the clips from this class to be misclassified by the real-time video
classifier. Second, for all the clips from other (non-target) classes,
we want the classifier to correctly classify them.
3.2 Our datasets
We use the human action recognition dataset UCF-101 [37] and the
hand gesture recognition dataset 20BN-JESTER dataset (Jester) [7]
to validate our attacks on video classification systems. We use these
two datasets because they represent two kinds of classification, i.e.,
coarse-gained and fine-grained action classification.
The UCF 101 dataset: The UCF 101 dataset used in our experi-
ments is the standard dataset collected from Youtube. It includes
13320 videos from 101 human action categories (e.g., applying lip-
stick, biking, blow drying hair, cutting in the kitchen etc.). The
videos collected in this dataset have variations in camera motion,
appearance, background, illumination conditions etc. Given the
diversity it provides, we consider the dataset to validate the fea-
sibility of our attack model on coarse-gained actions. There are
three different (pre-existing) splits [37] in the dataset; we use split
1 for both training and testing, in our experiments. The training set
includes 9,537 video clips and the testing set includes 3,783 video
clips.
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Figure 2: The C3D architecture[42]. C3D net has 8 convolution, 5 max-pooling, and 2 fully connected layers, followed by a
softmax output layer. All 3D convolution kernels are 3 × 3 × 3 with a stride [42] of 1 in both spatial and temporal dimensions.
The number of filters are shown in each box. The 3D pooling layers are represented from pool1 to pool5. All pooling kernels
are 2 × 2 × 2, except for pool1, which is 1 × 2 × 2. Each fully connected layer has 4096 output units.
(a) GAN Architecture
(b) Our Architecture
Figure 3: This figure compares our architecture with tradi-
tional GAN architectures. Our architecture is different from-
traditional GAN in the following aspects: 1) The discrimi-
nator is a pre-trained classifier we attack, whose goal is to
classify videos, and not to distinguish between the natural
and synthesized inputs; 2) The generator generates pertur-
bations, and not direct inputs to the discriminator, and the
perturbed training inputs are fed to discriminator; 3) The
learning objective is to let the discriminator misclassify the
perturbed inputs.
The Jester dataset: The 20BN-JESTER dataset (Jester) is a re-
cently collected dataset with hand gesture videos. These videos
are recorded by crowd-source workers performing 27 kinds of ges-
tures (e.g., sliding hand left, sliding two fingers left, zooming in
with full hand, zooming out with full hand etc.). We use this dataset
to validate our attack with regards to fine-grained actions. Since
this dataset does not currently provide labels for the testing set, we
use the validation set as our testing set (i.e., apply our perturbations
on the validation set). The training set has 148,092 short video clips
and our testing set has 14,787 short video clips.
4 GENERATING PERTURBATIONS FOR
REAL-TIME VIDEO STREAM
From the adversary’s perspective, we first consider the challenge
of attacking a real-time video stream. In brief, when attacking an
image classification system, the attackers usually take the following
approach. First, they obtain the target image that is to be attacked
with its true label. Next, they formulate a problem wherein they
try to compute the “minimum” noise that is to be added in order to
cause a mis-classification of the target. The formulation takes into
account the function of the classifier, the input image, and its true
label. In contrast, in the context of real-time video classification, the
video is not available to the attackers a priori. Thus, they will need
to create perturbations that can effectively perturb an incoming
video stream, whenever a target class is present.
Our approach is to compute the perturbations offline and ap-
ply them online. Since we cannot predict what is captured in the
video, we need perturbations which work with unseen inputs. A
type of perturbations that satisfies this requirement is called the
Universal Perturbation (UP), which has been studied in the con-
text of generating adversarial samples against image classification
systems [26, 29]. In particular, Mopuri et al. , have developed a
generative model that learns the space of universal perturbations
for images using a GAN-like architecture.
Inspired by this work, we develop a similar architecture, but
make modifications to suit our objective. Our goal is to generate
adversarial perturbations that fool the discriminator instead of
exploring the space for diverse UPs. In addition, we retrofit the
architecture to handle video inputs. Our architecture is depicted
in Figure 3b. It consists of three main components: 1) a 3D genera-
tor which generates universal perturbations; 2) a post-processor,
which for now does not do anything but is needed to solve other
challenges described in subsequent sections; and 3) a pre-trained
discriminator for video classification, e.g., the C3D model described
in § 2.2. Note that unlike in traditional GANs wherein the gener-
ator and the discriminator are trained together, we only train the
generator to generate universal perturbations to fool a fixed type
of discriminator.
The 3D generator in ourmodel is configured to use 3D deconvolu-
tion layers and provide 3D outputs as shown in Figure 8. Specifically,
it generates a clip of perturbations, whose size is equal to the size
of the video clips taken as input by the C3D classifier. To generate
universal perturbations, the generator first takes a noise vector z
from a latent space. Next, It maps z to a perturbation clip p, such
that, G(z) = p. It then adds the perturbations on a training clip x
to obtain the perturbed clip x + p. Let c(x) be the true label of x .
This perturbed clip is then input to the C3D model which outputs
the score vectorQ(x +p) (for the perturbed clip). The classification
should ensure that the highest score corresponds to the true class
(c(x) for input x) in the benign setting. Thus, the attacker seeks
to generate a p such that the C3D classifier outputs a low score
to the c(x)th element in Q vector (denoted as Qc(x )) for x + p. In
other words, this means that after applying the perturbation, the
probability of mapping x to class c(x) is lower than the probability
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that it is mapped to a different class (i.e., the input is not correctly
recognized).
We seek to make this perturbation clip p “a universal perturba-
tion”, i.e., adding p to any input clip belonging to the target class
would cause misclassification. This means that we seek to minimize
the sum of the cross-entropy loss over all the training data as per
Equation 1. Note that the lower the cross-entropy loss, the higher
the divergence of the predicted probability from the true label [16].
minimize
G
∑
x ∈X
− log[1 −Qc(x )(x +G(z)] (1)
When the generator is being trained, for each training sample, it
obtains feedback from the discriminator and adjusts its parameters
to cause the discriminator to misclassify that sample. It tries to find
a perturbation that works for every sample from the distribution
space known to the discriminator. At the end of this phase, the
attacker will have a generator that outputs universal perturbations
which can cause the misclassification on any incoming input sample
from the same distribution (as that of the training set). However, as
discussed next, just applying the universal perturbations alone will
not be sufficient to carry out a successful attack. In particular, the
attack can cause unintended clips to be misclassified as well, which
could compromise our stealth requirement as discussed next in §5.
5 MAKING PERTURBATIONS STEALTHY
Blindly adding universal perturbations will affect the classification
of clips belonging to other non-targeted classes. This may raise
alarms, especially if many of such misclassifications are mapped on
to rare actions. Thus, while causing the target class to be misclassi-
fied, the impact on the other classes must be imperceptible. This
problem can be easily solved when dealing with image recognition
systems since images are self-contained entities, i.e., perturbations
can be selectively added on target images only. However, video in-
puts change temporally and an action captured in a set of composite
frames may differ from that in the subsequent frames. It is thus
hard to a priori identify (choose) the frames relating to the target
class, and add perturbations specifically on them. For example, con-
sider a case with surveillance in a grocery store. If attackers seek
to misclassify an action related to shoplifting and cause this action
to go undetected, they do not have a priori knowledge about when
this action will be captured. And adding universal perturbations
blindly could cause mis-classifications of other actions (e.g., other
benign customer actions may be mapped onto shoplifting actions
thus triggering alarms).
Since it is hard (or even impossible) to a priori identify the
frame(s) that capture the intended actions and choose them for per-
turbation, the attackers need to add perturbations on each frame.
However, to make these perturbations furtive, they need to en-
sure that the perturbations added only mis-classifies the target
class while causing other (non-targeted) classes to be classified
correctly. We name this unique kind of universal perturbations as
“Dual-Purpose Universal Perturbations” or DUP for short.
In order to realize DUPs, we have to guarantee that for the input
clip xt , if it belongs to the target class (denote the set of inputs
from target class as T ), the C3D classifier returns a low score with
respect to the correct class c(xt ), i.e., Qc(xt ). For input clips xs that
(a) This figure depicts a scenario where there is a mismatch between
the clip an attacker views to generate a perturbation, and the clip a
classifier views for classification.
(b) This figure displays a scenario where the stride of the sliding win-
dow is smaller than the size of a clip. In such a case, the attackerwill not
knowwhat perturbation to use on a frame, as the frame can be selected
in multiple input clips used in classification.
Figure 4: The sliding window used to capture clips that are
input to the video classification system
belongs to other (non-target) classes (denote the set of inputs from
non-target classes as S , thus, S = X −T ), the model returns high
scores with regards to their correct mappings (Qc(xs )). To cause the
generator to output DUPs, we refine the optimization problem in
Equation 1 as shown in Equation 2:
minimize
G
λ ×
∑
xt ∈T
− log[1 −Qc(xt )(xt +G(z))]
+
∑
xs ∈S
− log[Qc(xs )(xs +G(z))]
(2)
The first term in the equation again relates to minimizing the
cross-entropy of the target class, while the second term maximizes
the cross-entropy relating to each of the other classes. The param-
eter λ is the weight applied with regards to the misclassification
of the target class. For attacks where stealth is more important,
we may use a smaller λ to guarantee that the emphasis on the
misclassification probability of the target class is reduced while
the classification of the non-target classes are affected to the least
extent possible.
6 THE TIME MACHINE: HANDLING THE
TEMPORAL DIMENSION
The final challenge that the attackers will need to address in order
to effectively generate adversarial perturbations against real-time
video classification systems is to handle the temporal structure that
exists across the frames in a video. In this section, we first discuss
why directly applying existing methods that target images to gener-
ate perturbations against video streams do not work. Subsequently,
we propose a new set of perturbations that overcome this challenge.
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6.1 The boundary effect
The input to the video classifier is a clip of a sequence of frames. As
discussed earlier, given an input clip, it is possible to generate per-
turbations for each frame in that clip. However, the attacker cannot
a priori determine the clip boundaries used by the video classifier.
In particular, as discussed in § 2.1, there are three hyper-parameters
that are associated with a sliding window of a video classifier. They
are the window size, the stride and the starting position of the clip.
All three parameters affect the effectiveness of the perturbations.
While the first two parameters are known to a white-box attacker,
the last parameter is an artifact of when the video clip is captured
and input to the classifier and cannot be known a priori.
The perturbation that is to be added to a frame depends on the
relative location of the frame within the clip. In other words, if
the location of the frame changes because of a temporally stag-
gered clip, the perturbation needs to adjusted accordingly. Thus
at a high level, the boundaries of the clips used by the classifier
will have an effect on the perturbations that need to be generated.
We refer to this phenomenon as the boundary effect. To formalize
the problem, let us suppose that there is a video stream repre-
sented by {..., fi−2, fi−1, fi , fi+1, fi+2, ...} where each fj represents
a frame. The perturbation on fi that is generated based on the
clip [fi , fi+1, · · · , fi+w−1] to achieve misclassification of a target
action, will be different from the one generated based on the tempo-
rally staggered clip [fi−1, fi , fi+1 · · · , fi+w−2] to achieve the same
purpose.
To exemplify this problem, we consider using the traditional
methods to attack C3D model. In particular, we use the API from
the CleverHans repository [32] to generate video perturbations.
Note that, the perturbations generated by CleverHans are neither
universal nor dual-purpose; they simply generate a specific per-
turbation given a specific input clip. We use the basic iteration
methods with default parameters. Our approach is as follows. We
consider all the videos in the UCF-101 testing set. We consider dif-
ferent boundaries for the clips in the videos (temporally staggered
versions of the clips) and use the Python libraries from CleverHans
to generate perturbations for each staggered version. Note that the
sliding window size for C3D is 16 and thus, there are 16 staggered
versions. We choose a candidate frame, and compute the correla-
tions between the perturbations added in the different staggered
versions. Specifically, the perturbations are tensors and the normal-
ized correlation between two perturbations is the inner product of
the unit-normalized tensors representing the perturbations.
We represent the average normalized correlations in the pertur-
bations (computed across all videos and all frames) for different
offsets (i.e., the difference in the location of the candidate frame in
the two staggered clips) in the matrix shown in Figure 5. The row
index and the column index represent the location of the frames
in the two staggered clips. For example, the entry corresponding
to {7, 7} represents the case where the frame considered was the
7th frame in the two clips. In this case, clearly the correlation is
1.00. However, we see that the correlations are much lower if the
positions of the same frame in the two clips are different. As an
example, consider the entry {5, 9}: its average normalized correla-
tion is 0.39, which indicates that the perturbations that CleverHans
adds in the two cases are quite different.
Figure 5: The average normalized correlation matrix com-
putedwith perturbations generated using the basic iteration
API from CleverHans. Both row and column represent the
location of frame in clips and the value represents the cor-
relation between perturbations on the same frames but gen-
erated when that frame located in different positions in the
two temporally staggered clips.
In Figure 6, we show the average magnitude of perturbations
added (over all frames and all videos), when the target frame is
at different locations within a clip. The abscissa depicts the frame
position, and the ordinate represents the magnitude of the average
perturbation. We observe that the magnitude of the perturbation on
the first and last few frames are larger than those in the middle. We
conjecture this is because the difference in perturbation between
consecutive frame locations are similar (because the clips with
small temporal offsets are similar); but as the frame location differs
by a lot, the perturbation difference will again go up (clips with
larger offsets will be more diverse).
Figure 6: Magnitude of perturbation on each frame: The x
axis is the frame position, and the y axis is themagnitude of
average perturbation on the frame.
We further showcase the impact of the boundary effect by mea-
suring the degradation in attack efficacy due tomismatches between
the anticipated start point when the perturbation is generated and
the actual start point when classifying the clip (as shown in Fig-
ure 4a). Figure 7 depicts the results. The abscissa is the offset be-
tween the clip considered for perturbation generation and the clip
used in classification. We can see that as the distance between the
two start points increases, the attack success rate initially degrades
but increases again as the clip now becomes similar to the subse-
quent clip. For example, if the offset is 15, the clip chosen is almost
identical to the subsequent clip.
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The boundary effect is also experienced when the stride used by
the classifier is smaller than the clip size. In brief, stride refers to
the extent to which the receiver’s sliding window advances when
considering consecutive clips during classification. If the stride is
equal to the clip size, there is no overlap between the clips that are
considered as inputs for classification. On the other hand, if the
stride is smaller than the size of the clip, which is often the case
[6, 8, 42, 43], the clips used in classification will overlap with each
other as shown in Figure 4b. A stride that is smaller than the clip
size will cause the same problem discussed above with respect to
the temporal offset between the attackers’ anticipation of the start
point and the actual start point of the classifier. As evident from
the figure, such a stride induces an offset, and this results in the
same behaviors that we showcased above.
Figure 7: Attack success rate when there is mismatch. The
x axis is the offset between the clip generating perturbation
and the clip tested. The y axis is the attack success rate.
Figure 8: This figure illustrates the Generator and Roll for
generating C-DUP. 1) The generator takes a noise vector as
input, and outputs a perturbation clip with 16 frames. The
output size for each layer is shown as temporal dimension×
horizontal spatial dimension × vertical spatial dimension ×
number of channels. 2) The roll part shifts the perturbation
clip by some offset. The figure shows one example where we
roll the front black frame to the back.
6.2 Circular Dual-Purpose Universal
Perturbation
The above discussion shows that the boundary effect makes it
especially challenging to attack video classification systems. To
cope with this effect, we significantly extend the DUPs proposed
in § 5 to compose what we call “Circular Dual-Purpose Universal
Perturbations (C-DUP).”
Figure 9: This figure illustrates the Generator and Tile for
generating 2D-DUP. 1) The generator takes a noise vector as
input, and outputs a single-frame perturbation. 2) The tile
part constructs a perturbation clip by repeating the single-
frame perturbation generated 16 times.
Let us uppose that the size of sliding window isw . Then, the DUP
clipp includesw frames (of perturbation), denoted by [p1,p2, · · · ,pw ].
Since p is a clip of universal perturbations, we launch the attack
by repeatedly adding perturbations on each consecutive clip con-
sisting ofw frames, in the video stream. One can visualize that we
are generating a perturbation stream which can be represented as
[· · · ,pw−1,pw ,p1,p2, · · · ]. Now, our goal is to guarantee that the
perturbation stream works regardless of the clip boundaries chosen
by the classifier. In order to achieve this goal, we need any cyclic
or circular shift of the DUP clip to yield a valid perturbation. In
other words, we require the perturbation clips [pw ,p1, · · · ,pw−1],
[pw−1,pw ,p1, · · · ,pw−2], and so on, all to be valid perturbations. To
formalize, we define a permutation function Roll(p,o) which yields
a cyclic shift of the original DUP perturbation by an offset o. In
other words, when using [p1,p2, · · · ,pw ] as input to Roll(p,o), the
output is [pw−o ,pw−o+1, · · ·pw ,p1 · · ·pw−o−1]. Now, for all values
of o ∈ {0,w − 1}, we need po = Roll(p,o) to be a valid perturba-
tion clip as well. Towards achieving this requirement, we use a
post-processor unit which applies the roll function between the
generator and the discriminator. This post processor is captured in
the complete architecture is shown in Figure 3b.
The details of how the generator and the roll unit operate in
conjunction are depicted in Figure 8. As before, the 3D generator
(G) takes a noise vector as input and outputs a sequence of perturba-
tions (as a perturbation clip). Note that the final layer is followed by
a tanh non-linearity which constrains the perturbation generated
to the range [-1,1]. The last thing is to scale the output by ξ . Doing
so restricts the perturbation’s range to [−ξ , ξ ]. Following the work
in [26, 29], the value of ξ is chosen to be 10 towards making the per-
turbation quasi-imperceptible. The roll unit then “rolls” (cyclically
shifts) the perturbation p by an offset in {0, 1, 2, · · · ,w−1}. Figure 8
depicts the process with an offset equal to 1; the black frame is rolled
to the end of the clip. By adding the rolled perturbation clip to the
training input, we get the perturbed input. As discussed earlier, the
C3D classifier takes the perturbed input and outputs a classification
score vector. As before, we want the true class scores to be (a) low
for the targeted inputs and (b) high for other (non-targeted) inputs.
We now modify our optimization function to incorporate the roll
function as follows.
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minimize
G
∑
o=1,2· · ·w
{λ ×
∑
xt ∈T
− log[1 −Qc(xt )(xt + Roll(G(z),o))]
+
∑
xs ∈S
− log[Qc(xs )(xs + Roll(G(z),o))]}
(3)
The equation is essentially the same as Equation 2, but we con-
sider all possible cyclic shifts of the perturbation output by the
generator.
6.3 2D Dual-Purpose Universal Perturbation
We also consider a special case of C-DUP, wherein we impose an
additional constraint which is that “the perturbations added on all
frames should be the same.” In other words, we seek to add a single
2D perturbation on each frame which can be seen as a special case
of C-DUP with p1 = p2 = · · · = pw . We call this kind of DUP as
2D-DUP. 2D-DUP allows us to examine the effect of the temporal
dimension in generating adversarial perturbations on video inputs.
The generator in this case will output a single-frame perturbation
instead of a sequence of perturbation frames as shown in Figure 9.
This is a stronger constraint than the circular constraint, which
may cause the attack success rate to decrease (note that the cyclic
property still holds). However, with this constraint, the perturbation
generated is much simpler and easier to use.
We denote the above 2D perturbation as p2d . The perturbation
clip is then generated by simply creating copies of the perturba-
tion and tiling them to compose a clip. The 2D-DUP clip is now
pt ile = [p2d ,p2d , · · · ,p2d ] (see Figure 9). Thus, given that the at-
tack objective is the same as before, we simply replace the Roll(p,o)
function with a Tile function and our formulation now becomes:
minimize
G2D
λ ×
∑
xt ∈T
−loд[1 −Qc(xt )(xt +Tile(G2D (z)))]
+
∑
xs ∈S
−loд[Qc(xs )(xs +Tile(G2D (z)))]
(4)
7 EVALUATIONS
In this section, we showcase the efficacy of the perturbations gen-
erated by our proposed approaches on both the UCF-101 and Jester
datasets.
7.1 Experimental Setup
Discriminator set-up for our experiments: We used the C3D
classifier as our discriminator. To set up the discriminator for our
experiments, we pre-train the C3D classifier as described in §4. The
discriminator is then used to train our generator. For our experi-
ments on the UCF101 dataset, we use the C3D model available in
the Github repository [40]. This pre-trained C3D model achieves an
average clip classification accuracy of 96.1% on the UCF101 dataset
in benign settings (i.e., no adversarial inputs).
For the experiments on the Jester dataset, we fine-tune the C3D
model from the Github repository [40]. First, we change the output
size of the last fully connected layer to 27, since there are 27 gesture
classes in Jester. We use a learning rate with exponential decay
[52] to train the model. The starting learning rate for the last fully
connected layer is set to be 10−3 and 10−4 for all the other layers.
The decay step is set to 600 and the decay rate is 0.9. The fine-tuning
phase is completed in 3 epochs and we achieve a clip classification
accuracy of 90.03% in benign settings.
Generator set-up for our experiments: For building our gener-
ators, we refer to the generative model used by Vondrik et al. [49],
which has 3D de-convolution layers.
For generators for both C-DUP and 2D-DUP, we use five 3D
de-convolution layers [4]. The first four layers are followed by
a batch normalization [17] and a ReLU [30] activation function.
The last layer is followed by a tanh [18] layer. The kernel size
for all 3D de-convolutions is set to be 3 × 3 × 3. To generate 3D
perturbations (i.e., sequence of perturbation frames), we set the
kernel stride in the C-DUP generator to 1 in both the spatial and
temporal dimensions for the first layer, and 2 in both the spatial and
temporal dimensions for the following 4 layers. To generate a single-
frame 2D perturbation, the kernel stride in the temporal dimension
is set to 1 (i.e., 2D deconvolution) for all layers in the 2D-CUP
generator, and the spatial dimension stride is 1 for the first layer
and 2 for the following layers. The numbers of filters are shown
in brackets in Figure 8 and Figure 9. The input noise vector for
both generators are sampled from a uniform distributionU [−1, 1]
and the dimension of the noise vector is set to be 100. For training
both generators, we use a learning rate with exponential decay.
The starting learning rate is 0.002. The decay step is 2000 and the
decay rate is 0.95. Unless otherwise specified, the weight balancing
the two objectives, i.e., λ, is set to 1 to reflect equal importance
between misclassifying the target class and retaining the correct
classification for all the other (non-target) classes.
Technical Implementation: All the models are implemented in
TensorFlow [1] with the Adam optimizer [22]. Training was per-
formed on 16 Tesla K80 GPU cards with the batch size set to 32.
Dataset setup for our experiments: On the UCF-101 dataset
(denoted UCF-101 for short), different sets of target class T are
tested. We useT = {apply lipstick} for presenting the results in the
paper. Experiments using other target sets also yield similar results.
UCF-101 has 101 classes of human actions in total. The target set
T contains only one class while the “non-target” set S = X − T
contains 100 classes. The number of training inputs from the non-
target classes is approximately 100 times the number of training
inputs from the target class. Directly training with UCF-101 may
cause a problem due to the imbalance in the datasets containing
the target and non-target classes [24]. Therefore, we under-sample
the non-target classes by a factor of 10. Further, when loading a
batch of inputs for training, we fetch half the batch of inputs from
the target set and the other half from the non-target set in order to
balance the inputs.
For the Jester dataset, we also choose different sets of target
classes. We use two target sets T1 = {sliding hand right} and T2 =
{shaking hands} as our representative examples because they are
exemplars of two different scenarios. Since we seek to showcase
an attack on a video classification system, we care about how the
perturbations affect both the appearance information and temporal
flow information, especially the latter. For instance, the ‘sliding
hand right’ class has a temporally similar class ‘sliding two fingers
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Figure 10: DUP on UCF-101
Figure 11: C-DUP on UCF-101
Figure 12: C-DUP on Jester for T1 = {slding hand right}
Figure 13: C-DUP on Jester for T2 = {shaking hand}
right;’ as a consequence, it may be easier for attackers to cause clips
in the former class to be misclassified as the later class (because
the temporal information does not need to be perturbed much). On
the other hand, ‘shaking hands’ is not temporally similar to any
other class. Comparing the results of these two target sets could
provide some empirical evidence on the impact of the temporal flow
on our perturbations. Similar to UCF-101, the number of inputs
from the non-target classes is around 26 times the number of inputs
from the target class (since there are 27 classes in total and we only
have one target class in each experiment). So we under-sample the
non-target inputs by a factor of 4. We also set up the environment
to load half of the inputs from the target set and the other half from
the non-target set, in every batch.
Metrics of interest: For measuring the efficacy of our perturba-
tions, we consider two metrics. First, the perturbations added on
the videos should be quasi-imperceptible. Second, the attack success
rate for the target and the non-target classes should be high. We
define attack success rates as follows:
• The attack success rate for the target class is the misclassification
rate;
• the attack success rate for the other classes is the correct classifi-
cation rate.
7.2 C-DUP Perturbations
In this subsection, we discuss the results of the C-DUP perturbation
attack. We use the universal perturbations (UP) and DUP perturba-
tions as our baselines.
7.2.1 Experimental Results on UCF101.
Visualizing the perturbation: The perturbation clip generated
by the DUP model is shown in Figure 10 and the perturbation clip
generated by C-DUP model is shown in Figure 11. The perturbation
clip has 16 frames, and we represent a visual representation of the
first 8 frames for illustration1 We observe that the perturbation
from DUP manifests an obvious disturbance among the frames.
With C-DUP, the perturbation frames look similar, which implies
that C-DUP does not perturb the temporal information by much,
in UCF101.
1The complete 16-frame perturbation clips are shown in an appendix.
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(a) Attack success rate on UCF-101 for target class
’applying lipstick’
(b) Attack success rate on UCF-101 for other non-target
classes (all except ’applying lipstick’)
(c) Attack success rate on Jester for target class
’sliding hands right’
(d) Attack success rate on Jester for non-target classes (all
excepet ’sliding right’)
(e) Attack success rate on Jester for target class
’shaking hand’
(f) Attack success rate on Jester for non-target classes (all
except ’shaking hand’)
Figure 14: attack success rate for DUP and C-DUP
Attack success rates: Recalling the discussion in §5, one can ex-
pect that UP would cause inputs from the target class to be misclas-
sified, but also significantly affect the correct classification of the
other non-target inputs. On the other hand, oue would expect that
DUP would achieve a stealthy attack, which would not cause much
effect on the classification of non-target classes.
Based on the discussion in §6, we expect that DUP would work
well when the perturbation clip is well-aligned with the start point
of each input clip to the classifier; and the attack success rate would
degrade as the misalignment increases. We expect C-DUP would
overcome this boundary effect and provide a better overall attack
performance (even with temporal misalignment).
We observe that when one considers no misalignment, DUP
achieves a target misclassification rate of 84.49 %, while the non-
target classes are correctly classified with a rate of 88.03 %. In
contrast, when UP achieves a misclassification rate of 84.01 % for the
target class, only 45.2 % of the other classes are correctly classified.
Given UP’s inferior performance, we do not consider it any further
in our evaluations.
The attack success rates with DUP and C-DUP, on the UCF-101
test set, are shown in Figure 14a and Figure 14b. The x axis is the
misalignment between perturbation clip and and the input clip to
the classifier. Figure 14a depicts the average misclassification rate
for inputs from the target class. We observe that when there is
no misalignment, the attack success rate with the DUP is 84.49%,
which is in fact slightly higher than C-DUP. However, the attack
success rate with C-DUP is significantly higher when there is mis-
alignment. Furthermore, the average attack success rate across all
alignments for the target class with C-DUP is 84%, while with DUP
it is only 68.26%. This demonstrates that C-DUP is more robust
against boundary effects.
Figure 14b shows that, with regards to the classification of inputs
from the non-target classes, C-DUP also achieves a performance
slightly better than DUP when there is mismatch. The average
attack success rate (across all alignments) with C-DUP is 87.52%
here, while with DUP it is 84.19%.
7.2.2 Experimental Results on Jester.
Visualizing the perturbation: Visual representations of the C-
DUP perturbations for the two target sets,T1 = {sliding hand right}
and T2 = {shaking hands} are shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13.
We notice that compared to the perturbation generated on UCF-101
(see Figure 11). there is a more pronounced evolution with respect
to Jester (see Figure 12 and Figure 13). We conjecture that this is
because UCF-101 is a coarse-grained action dataset in which the
spatial (appearance) information is dominant. As a consequence,
the C3D model does not extract/need much temporal information
to perform well. However, Jester is a fine-grained action dataset
where temporal information plays a more important role. Therefore,
in line with expectations, we find that in order to attack the C3D
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Figure 15: Visualizing images after adding 2D dual purpose universal perturbation: Original frames are displayed in the first
row and perturbed frames are displayed in the second row. The perturbation added to the frames in the second row is mostly
imperceptible to the human eye.
model trained on the Jester dataset, a higher extent of perturbations
are required on the temporal dimension.
Attack success rate: To showcase a comparison of the misclas-
sification rates with respect to the target class between the two
schemes (DUP and C-DUP), we adjust the weighting factor λ such
that the classification accuracy with respect to non-target classes
are similar. By choosing λ = 1.5 for DUP and 1 for C-DUP, we
are able to achieve this. The attack success rates for the above
two target sets are shown in Figure 14c and Figure 14d, and Fig-
ure 14e and Figure 14f, respectively. We see that with respect to
T1 = {sliding hand right}, the results are similar to what we ob-
serve with UCF101. The attack success rates for C-DUP are a little
lower than DUP when the offset is 0. This is to be expected since
DUP is tailored for this specific offset. However, C-DUP outper-
forms DUP when there is a misalignment. The average success rate
for C-DUP is 85.14% for the target class and 81.03% for the other
(non-target) classes. The average success rate for DUP is 52.42% for
the target class and 82.36% for the other (non-target) classes.
Next we consider the case withT2 = {shaking hands}. In general,
we find that both DUP and C-DUP achieve relatively lower success
rates especially with regards to the other (non-target) classes. As
discussed in §7.1, unlike in the previous case where ‘sliding two
fingers right’ is temporally similar to ‘sliding hand right’, no other
class is temporally similar to ‘shaking hand’. Therefore it is harder
to achieve misclassification. Figure 14f depicts the attack success
rates for non-target classes. The average success rate for non-target
classes are similar (because of the bias in λ as discussed earlier)
and in fact slightly higher for DUP (a finer bias could make them
exactly the same). The attack success rates with the two approaches
for the target class are shown in Figure 14e. We see that C-DUP
significantly outperforms DUP in terms of misclassification efficacy
because of its robustness to temporal misalignment. The average
attack success rate for the target class with C-DUP is 79.03% while
for DUP it is only 57.78%. Overall, our C-DUP outperforms DUP in
being able to achieve a better misclassification rate for the target
class. We believe that although stealth is affected to some extent, it
is still reasonably high.
7.3 2D-Dual Purpose Universal Perturbations
The visual representations of the perturbations with C-DUP show
that perturbations on all the frames are visually similar. Thus, we
ask if it is possible to add “the same perturbation” on every frame
and still achieve a successful attack. In other words, will the 2D-
DUP perturbation attack yield performance similar to the C-DUP
attack.
7.3.1 Experimental Results on the UCF101 Dataset.
Visual impact of the perturbation: We present a sequence of
original frames and its corresponding perturbed frames in Figure 15.
Original frames are displayed in the first row and perturbed frames
are displayed in the second row. We observe that the perturbation
added on the frames is quasi-imperceptible to human eyes (similar
results are seen with C-DUP and are presented in an appendix).
Attack success rate: By adding 2D-DUP on the video clip, we
achieve an attack success rate of 87.58% with respect to the tar-
get class and an attack success rate of 83.37% for the non-target
classes. Recall that the average attack success rates with C-DUP
were 87.52% and 84.00%, respectively. Thus, the performance of
2D-DUP seems to be on par with that of C-DUP on the UCF101
dataset. This demonstrates that C3D is vulnerable even if the same
2D perturbation generated by our approach is added on to every
frame.
7.3.2 Experimental Results on Jester Dataset.
Attack success rate: For T1 = {sliding hand right}, the attack
success rate for the target class is 84.64% and the attack success
rate for the non-target classes is 80.04%. This shows that 2D-DUP
is also successful on some target classes in the fine-grained, Jester
action dataset.
For the target setT2, the success rate for the target class drops to
70.92%, while the success rate for non-target class is 54.83%. This
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is slightly degraded compared to the success rates achieved with
C-DUP (79.03% and 57.78% respectively), but is still reasonable. This
degradation is due to more significant temporal changes in this
case (unlike in the case of T1) and a single 2D perturbation is less
effective in manipulating these changes. In contrast, because the
perturbations evolve with C-DUP, they are much more effective in
achieving the misclassification of the target class.
8 DISCUSSION
Black box attacks: In this work we assumed that the adversary
is fully aware of the DNN being deployed (i.e., white box attacks).
However, in practice the adversary may need to determine the
type of DNN being used in the video classification system, and
so a black box approach may be needed. Given recent studies on
the transferability of adversarial inputs [33], we believe black box
attacks are also feasible. We will explore this in our future work.
Context dependency: Second, the approach that we developed
does not account for contextual information, i.e., consistency be-
tween the misclassified result and the context. For example, the
context relates to a baseball game a human overseeing the system
may notice an inconsistency when the action of hitting a ball is
misclassified into applying makeup. Similarly, because of context,
if there is a series of actions that we want to misclassify, inconsis-
tency in the misclassification results (e.g., different actions across
the clips) may also raise an alarm. For example, let us consider a
case where the actions include running, kicking a ball, and applying
make up. While the first two actions can be considered to be reason-
able with regards to appearing together in a video, the latter two
are unlikely. Generating perturbations that are consistent with the
context of the video is a line of future work that we will explore and
is likely to require new techniques. In fact, looking for consistency
in context may be a potential defense, and we will also examine
this in depth in the future.
Defenses: In order to defense against the attacks against video
classification systems, one can try some existing defense methods
in image area, such as feature squeezing [50, 51] and ensemble
adversarial training [41] (although their effectiveness is yet un-
known). Considering the properties of video that were discussed,
we envision some exclusive defense methods for protecting video
classification systems below, which we will explore in future work.
One approach is to examine the consistency between the clas-
sification of consecutive frames (considered as images) within a
clip, and between consecutive clips in a stream. A sudden change
in the classification results could raise an alarm. However, while
this defense will work well in cases where the temporal flow is
not pronounced (e.g., the UCF101 dataset), it may not work well in
cases with pronounced temporal flows. For example, with respect
to the Jester dataset, with just an image it may be hard to determine
whether the hand is being moved right or left.
The second line of defense may be to identify an object that is
present in the video, e.g., a soccer ball in a video clip that depicts a
kicking action. We can use an additional classifier to identify such
objects in the individual frames that compose the video. Then, we
can look for consistency with regards to the action and the object,
e.g., a kicking action is can be associated with a soccer ball, but
cannot be associated with a make up kit. Towards realizing this line
of defense, we could use existing image classifiers in conjunction
with the video classification system. We will explore this in future
work.
9 RELATEDWORK
There is quite a bit of work [2, 3, 15] on investigating the vulnerabil-
ity of machine learning systems to adversarial inputs. Researchers
have shown that generally, small magnitude perturbations added to
input samples, change the predictions made by machine learning
models. Most efforts, however, do not consider real-time tempo-
rally varying inputs such as video. Unlike these efforts, our study
is focused on the generation of adversarial perturbations to fool
DNN based real-time video action recognition systems.
The threat of adversarial samples to deep-learning systems has
also received considerable attention recently. There are several
papers in the literature (e.g., [10, 11, 26, 27, 35]) that have shown that
the state-of-the-art DNN based learning systems are also vulnerable
to well-designed adversarial perturbations [39]. Szegedy et al. show
that the addition of hardly perceptible perturbation on an image,
can cause a neural network to misclassify the image. Goodfellow
et al. [11] analyze the potency of adversarial samples available in
the physical world, in terms of fooling neural networks. Moosavi-
Dezfooli et al. [26–28] make a significant contribution by generating
image-agnostic perturbations, which they call universal adversarial
perturbations. These perturbations can cause all natural images
belonging to target classes to be misclassified with high probability.
GANs or generative adversarial networks have been employed
by Goodfellow et al. [10] and Radford et al. [34] in generating natu-
ral images. Mopuri et al. [29] extend a GAN architecture to train a
generator to model universal perturbations for images. Their ob-
jective was to explore the space of the distribution of universal
adversarial perturbations in the image space. We significantly ex-
tend the generative framework introduced by Mopuri et al. [29]. In
addition, unlike their work which focused on generating adversar-
ial perturbations for images, our study focuses on the generation
of effective perturbations to attack videos.
The feasibility of adversarial attacks against other types of learn-
ing systems including face-recognition systems [25, 35, 36], voice
recognition systems [5] and malware classification systems [12] has
been studied. However, these studies do not account for the unique
input characteristics that are present in real-time video activity
recognition systems.
10 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the problem of generating adversar-
ial samples for attacking video classification systems. We identify
three key challenges that will need to be addressed in order to gen-
erate such samples namely, generating perturbations in real-time,
making the perturbations stealthy and accounting for the temporal
structure of frames in a video clip. We exploit recent advances in
GAN architectures, extending them significantly to solve these chal-
lenges and generate very potent adversarial samples against video
classification systems. We perform extensive experiments on two
different datasets one of which captures coarse-grained actions (e.g.,
applying make up) while the other captures fine-grained actions
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(hand gestures). We demonstrate that our approaches are extremely
potent, achieving around 80 % attack success rates in both cases.
We also discuss possible defenses that we propose to investigate in
future work.
A APPENDIX: VISUALIZING
PERTURBATIONS ON UCF101
We visualize a full range of perturbations and their correspond-
ing video representations on the UCF-101 dataset here. Figure 16
shows the entire Circular Dual-Purpose Universal Perturbation
(C-DUP) clip (with 16 frames) generated for a target class T =
{apply lipstick}. Similarly, Figure 17 shows the entire 2D Dual-
Purpose Universal Perturbation (2D-DUP) for same target class.
Figure 18 shows a clean video clip from UCF101 dataset. Fig-
ure 19 shows the same video clip perturbed by the C-DUP shown
in Figure 16. Similarly, Figure 20 shows the video clip perturbed
by 2D-DUP shown in Figure 17. In both cases, we observe that the
perturbation is quasi-imperceptible to human vision i.e., the frames
in the videos look very much like the original.
B APPENDIX: VISUALIZING
PERTURBATIONS ON JESTER
Figure 21 shows the entire C-DUP generated for clip to misclassify
the target classT = {shaking hand} on the Jester dataset. Similarly,
Figure 22 depicts the entire 2D-DUP generated for misclassifying
the same target class.
Figure 23 shows a clean video clip from Jester dataset corre-
sponding to shaking of the hand (visible only in some of the frames
shown due to cropping). Figure 24 shows the clip perturbed by C-
DUP shown in Figure 21 from the Jester dataset. Similarly Figure 25
shows the same clip perturbed by 2D-DUP shown in Figure 22. It is
easy to see that the perturbation is quasi-imperceptible to human
vision.
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